France’s 2027 presidential race: A new transitional election

As in 2017, the upcoming French presidential election will be a transitional one that could trigger further political upheaval. Emmanuel Macron, the incumbent President, is no longer eligible to run. His departure opens a wide range of contenders. Jordan Bardella (National Rally, RN) is leading in the polls and considered the frontrunner. But his election is far from certain. The campaign that has already unofficially begun could therefore hold a few surprises.

A disunited and historically weak left

What are the chances of the left? Very slim. It could be eliminated from the second round for the third consecutive time. It will be Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s fourth attempt since 2012. A powerful speaker, comfortable in the media, able to use the registers of radicalism and a unifying discourse, he is more than anyone else at ease in an election where personal capital and communication skills are key.

Mélenchon enters the fray with a disciplined movement. He could, as in 2017 and 2022, benefit from tactical voting from those who do not like him but desperately want the left to reach the second round. Will he succeed? It should not be ruled out in the context of a fragmented and evolving political landscape. However, his personal image is deeply tarnished. He is criticised for his ethnic factional rhetoric, authoritarianism, anti-European Union stance, conciliatory remarks towards Putin, al-Assad, and China; and numerous accusations of anti-Semitism are leveled against him. He is currently more “demonised” in the media and political class than the RN, which, for its part, has largely “de-demonised” itself. In a runoff between Mélenchon and Bardella, polls predict an emphatic victory for the RN leader.

The rest of the left claims to be organising a “unity primary”, intended to select a single left-wing candidate (outside of LFI). Negotiations between party leaders are stalled, the Socialist Party is divided on the issue, and the Communist Party refuses to participate. This primary will probably not happen, opening the door to multiple left-wing candidacies, including that of Raphaël Glucksmann, leader of the small Place Publique party, who is fiercely opposed to Mélenchon. If no non-LFI candidate gains traction in the polls by the end of 2026, the possibility of François Hollande, the former President, running as the saviour of the moderate left should not be ruled out.

Macronism rejected and the Republicans in decline

Who will embody the Macronist centre right? Two former Prime Ministers of Macron stand out: Édouard Philippe, president of the micro-party Horizons, and Gabriel Attal, president of Renaissance. A recent poll shows that the Macronist block is deeply fragmented: the “heirs” (35%) remain loyal to the centre right and will support either Philippe or Attal. Those “tempted by the right” (27%) could vote for Les Républicains (LR), or even the RN. Those “tempted by the left” (23%) are considering a return to the moderate left. Finally, the “disillusioned” (15%) appear disappointed by Macronism and politics in general and could abstain. Philippe is currently in second place in the polls behind Bardella, but he is being closely followed by Mélenchon. His stilted style is struggling to win people over, and he will find it difficult to distinguish himself from Macronism, which is now very unpopular.

The situation is hardly better within LR. Three main candidates are currently in the running: Bruno Retailleau, former Minister of the Interior and president of LR, was chosen by the party members in April 2026. David Lisnard, mayor of Cannes and a proponent of a broad right-wing coalition, is also a candidate. Xavier Bertrand, an elected Republican who opposes any alliance with the RN, could also run. None of them have the slightest chance of making it to the second round. In the event of a RN victory, will LR support the new far-right government? This is now a conceivable prospect for the (distant) heirs of Gaullism.

On the far right, there will be a new candidacy from Éric Zemmour, who has been convicted several times for racist comments and has popularised the themes of “great replacement” and “remigration” in the public debate.

Is the RN truly “de-demonised”?

We will have to wait until 7 July to find out if Marine Le Pen will be able to run, when the Paris Court of Appeal will issue a ruling concerning Le Pen’s conviction for illegal financing. If the appeal is upheld, she will be ineligible, and Bardella will be the candidate. Both are projected to win the election according to current polls, though Bardella appears slightly more popular. But Le Pen is experienced, while the young Bardella (31 years old) is not. Furthermore, she has a more “social” approach than Bardella, who has a neoliberal economic profile which could alienate part of the RN’s working-class electorate. He has already announced that the RN will backtrack on its proposal to return the retirement age to 62, a proposal which Le Pen still supports.

This is above all an historic election that could bring the far right to power in France for the first time since 1945. A RN presidency would have a significant impact on France’s domestic and foreign policy and would reinforce the nativist and nationalist camp in Europe.

The RN seems certain to qualify for the second round. Which other candidate will make it to the second round to challenge Bardella or Le Pen? A centre-left, pro-European candidate like Glucksmann or Hollande? That seems highly unlikely at present. A centre-right candidate like Édouard Philippe? It is a possibility, but he will have to overcome the widespread rejection of Macronism. A Bardella-Mélenchon showdown? That is a plausible scenario because Mélenchon excels in personalised elections and should still benefit from tactical voting on the left.

In this scenario, would we witness the return of the “Republican Front”, the alliance of all against the far right, in a great anti-fascist surge? This is indeed the great unknown of this election: has the RN definitively been “de-demonised”, like in other European countries, such as Italy? Or does a visceral aversion to it persist, leading “democrats of all stripes” to prefer, at the last minute, to support a candidate they dislike? This is Mélenchon’s hope. Is it realistic? Polls indicate that LFI is currently considered by voters to be “more dangerous for democracy than the RN”. It is therefore a slim hope.

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This article was first published on the UK In A Changing Europe website: https://ukandeu.ac.uk/frances-2027-presidential-race-a-new-transitional-election/