Donald Trump and the new world: reassessing the “end of History”
A new world has been born. It was not the American military intervention in Venezuela and the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro that marked its birth. As Antonio Gramsci wrote in his Prison Notebooks, the old world is not replaced by a single event. The new world emerges surreptitiously, following a series of diverse events. It is slow to emerge, and in this “interregnum,” disturbing political pathologies arise.
1991, the other new world
In 1991, another new world was born. It marked the end of the Cold War and, it was thought at the time, buried the rivalry between two blocs: the United States and the defunct USSR. This new world promised solid and lasting peace in Europe. Less than two decades later, several countries of the former Warsaw Pact joined NATO and, in some cases, the European Union. The United States was then the sole superpower. It could impose its diktat on the world in commercial, military, and geopolitical terms.
The post-Cold War United States was not isolationist. Economic and cultural globalisation was primarily American. American-inspired neoliberalism reached its peak in the 1990s and 2000s: market primacy, reduction of the role of the state, deregulation, privatisation, free trade, and the glorification of profit were all precepts that were supposed to enrich everyone through the “trickle-down” effect of wealth.
In parallel with its economic doctrine, the United States espoused a political doctrine: liberal interventionism. This ideology served as a roadmap for American foreign policy until the Biden presidency. Military interventions in sovereign countries were possible, even desirable, in the name of promoting democracy and human rights. The United States used its military power not only to defend its national interests, but also to strengthen peace and stability around the world. It was in the name of this doctrine that the United States embarked on disastrous military adventures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, already flouting international law.
American hegemony lasted for a time, then other superpowers emerged: China, a formidable commercial adversary, followed by India. Russia, under the iron fist of autocrat Vladimir Putin, partially rebuilt its military and economic power. After the global financial crisis, triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Chicago-style neoliberalism lost its appeal, without however giving rise to any economic or political alternatives. The election of Donald Trump in 2016 was a sign that the new post-Cold War world had grown old prematurely.
The death of liberal interventionism
Trump has clearly broken with the two pillars of classic American hegemony: liberal interventionism and strategic restraint, i.e., the idea that American interventionism can facilitate prosperity and peace in friendly countries. This strategy of restraint should not be confused with altruism. The growth of trade and the strengthening of world peace were supposed to ensure that no country would threaten the United States or become the new hegemon. The liberal hegemony of the United States had many flaws, but it ensured eight decades of peace in Europe, even if it did not eliminate all conflicts in the world.
With Donald Trump, the era of strategic restraint is over. The MAGA version of the United States no longer has to cooperate with less armed or poorer countries. Peace and security are negotiable on a transactional basis. Hence the scathing injunctions addressed to Europe to take charge of its own defence and arm Ukraine. By allying himself with Russia against Ukraine or with the coup in Venezuela, Trump reminds us that international law is not a moral injunction on sovereign states, but a regulatory system that aims to discourage inter-state conflicts. Adherence to international law allows states to act within a stable and secure framework, as the absence of common standards would lead to endless chaos.
The use of force as a means of resolving conflicts is always possible, but it comes at a cost: it draws states, even the most powerful ones, into a spiral of instability and makes the future unpredictable. International law therefore has a power that is not prescriptive, but dissuasive. Trump II, however, took the risk of breaking this conflict buffer. Maduro’s removal, as extraordinary and illegal as it may be, is not the original act of resorting to brute force against international law. The founding act of this Hobbesian period is Trump’s rallying behind Putin, the Russian dictator and aggressor of Ukraine.
Reassessing the “End of History”
For the past year, liberal interventionism has been replaced by a modus operandi that borders on illegality. Trump openly despises friendly countries, particularly Europe, with which the United States no longer shares “common values,” except for the European far right. The bright neoliberalism of the post-1991 era has been replaced by a protectionist economic policy based on punitive tariffs and economic imperialism (Venezuela is a huge oil field and Ukraine has significant deposits of critical minerals and rare earths). The notion of spheres of influence is more relevant than ever. Under the Monroe Doctrine (1823), revised by the “Trump Corollary,” the United States claims the right to rule the entire American continent militarily and economically. The new “Donroe Doctrine” brings American imperialism into a “post-Western” era: Europeans are no longer partners, but vassals.
In an article published in 1989, then in a book published in 1992, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold War marked the “end of History.” He claimed that the collapse of the USSR confirmed the historic victory of liberal democracy as a form of government, as well as the capitalist market economy. Inspired by Hegel, this thesis saw history as a dialectical process towards freedom. For Hegel and Fukuyama, the end of history meant the advent of reason and freedom in an inter-state system based on norms and law. For Fukuyama, the fall of the Berlin Wall proved that no alternative system to liberal democracy was possible. From 1991 onwards, we entered a “post-historical” world. In this world, conflicts and struggles still exist, but they no longer reach the level of systemic and ideological contestation of yesteryear (liberalism vs. socialism vs. fascism, etc.). Fukuyama considers the European Union to be the archetype of the “post-historical” institution.
According to Fukuyama, liberal democracy is superior to any other system (particularly of actually existing socialism in Eastern Europe) because it satisfies thymos (a “desire for recognition” in Greek), i.e., individual aspirations for identity recognition, equality, and freedom - ideals that authoritarian regimes cannot satisfy. Fukuyama’s thesis has always been contested, as it can be contradicted by regional situations. But it must be noted that liberal-capitalist regimes, though contested and sometimes hated, have not been replaced by an alternative political system anywhere in the last 35 years.
Trump’s Hobbesian presidency may be about to shatter the thesis of “the end of History.” Liberal democracies are threatened, not by an anti-capitalist left-wing counter-model, but by the rise of nationalist autocracies that circumvent international law and resort to brute force to settle political disputes. A liberal interventionist, Fukuyama believes in strengthening international law and solidarity. Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping see these as obstacles to their countries’ prosperity and influence. This tendency is evident in Trump’s “America First” agenda, which includes imposing tariffs, strengthening spheres of influence, unapologetically resorting to force, denying international law, and adopting a transactional and mercantile approach to inter-state relations.
With Trump and Putin, populist nationalism based on authoritarian and arbitrary political management has become a system of national and international government. Both are on a crusade against “woke culture,” transgender people, homosexuals, multiculturalism, and intellectuals, and aspire to a “virile” society in which men are the undisputed leaders. The pillars of a liberal society, necessary for the satisfaction of thymos, are being shaken. International institutions such as NATO, the EU, and the United Nations, providers of peace and economic prosperity, are under threat.
The new world of Trump, Putin, Xi Jinping, Modi, and Milei has resurrected ideological conflict by trampling on the cardinal values of liberal democracies. The return of history is grim and plunges us into uncertainty. This new world has just won some victories, but it has not yet triumphed. The unapologetic brutality of a Trump or a Putin confirms that democracies can die. This is the key lesson that Europeans must learn from the return of history.
Europe must finally understand that it has nothing to expect from an autocrat like Trump. Emmanuel Macron has been strongly criticized for merely “acknowledging the end of Maduro’s dictatorship,” without even mentioning the need to respect international law. Macron has made a serious political mistake, because appeasement has done little to stop Trump so far. Now he is claiming American sovereignty over Greenland, a European territory. But Macron’s critics must be consistent: reminding Trump of the law is necessary, but not enough. To protect themselves from Russian imperialism, which threatens peace in Europe, Europeans must certainly oppose the American president verbally, but they must also act. With the American shield in Europe no longer guaranteed, Europe must be prepared to defend itself. This is possible, but it must give itself the means to do so.